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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

The Act, by its terms, 5 becomes effective immediately upon final enactment,
which was June 9, 1939.
It is to be noted that similar statutes, or those with the same purpose in view,
have been enacted in a number of other states, notably Michigan,O Washington,7
Iowa,9 Nebraska, 9 and New York. 10
ROBERT I. SHADLE

c.

Waiver of Indictment on Plea of Not Guilty

The Act of June 15, 1939,1 amends the Act of April 15, 1907,2 by providing
that a person accused of any crime except homicide may "waive an indictment by a
grand jury" and enter "a plea of not guilty," and in such case the accused may be
tried for the crime "with or without a jury as provided by law."
This Act quite manifestly decr'eases the importance of the accusatory function
of the grand jury. The necessity of a formal accusation by a grand jury has been
for many years a fundamental characteristic of Anglo-American criminal procedure.
The necessity for securing an indictment from a grand jury and the powerlessness
of the king to proceed without in the early days (1249) in England is strikingly
demonstrated by Pollock and Maitland in their History of English Law.8 In more
recent times the necessity for an indictment by a grand jury has been regarded as
a traditiona! barrier and a valuable safeguard against the unjust oppression of the
accused.
It may well be argued that this barrier ought not to be destroyed unless its
uselessness has been fully demonstrated and is generally conceded, even though the
removal is limited to cases in which the accused apparently freely consents.
The gradual attrition of the importance of the accusatory function of the
grand jury is in marked contrast with recent remarkable increases in the importance and use of the inquisitorial function of the grand jury. Until recently, the
inquisitorial power of the grand jury was regarded as an extraordinary one, to be
exercised sparingly and with great caution and only when special circumstances
or pressing emergencies require it for the suppression of general and public evils.
But this, in view of very recent developments, can no longer be said to be true.
5

Section 3.

OMich. Public Acts of 1925, Act No. 280.
7Wasb. Acts 1903, p. 68, c. 56.
8lowa, Acts 37th Gen. Ass., c. 293.
gNeb. Comp. St. 1922, section 9737.
10N. Y. PENAL LAW, § 270, as amended by Laws 1917, C. 783.

1P. L. 400, 19 PURD. STATS. (Pa.) § 241.
2p. L. 62.
SVol. 2, p. 652.
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A state has, of course, the power to determine by its legislature the methods in
which it will initiate and conduct its prosecutions, save as restrained by constitutional restriction. There is no provision in the Federal Constitution requiring a
state to initiate its criminal prosecutions by indictment by a grand jury. The due
process of law clause does not require it.
The maintenance of the accusatory function of the grand jury was supposed
to be secured to the accused by Section 10 of Article I of the present Pennsylvania
Constitution, but one who, after reading the decision in Commonwealb v. Francies, 4 attacks the constitutionality of the present statute will demonstrate the truth
of the adage that fools rush in where angels fear to tread.
W. H. HITCHLER*

IV.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

When a woman marries, her correct legal surname becomes that of her husband. A subsequent divorce a vincudo does not of itself have the effect of restoring her maiden name. Such divorcee could have her name changed by a petition
under the Act of April 18, 1923.1 It has been held, however, that this statute
does not abrogate the common law rule that a person may assume any name which
does not interfere with the rights of others, and hence a divorced woman may
resume her maiden name without any statutory authority. 2 However, it would
seem d'esirable for her to have some formal, authoritative record of the change
and yet not need to take court proceedings under the general statute. To accomplish this the Legislature, following the lead of over thirty states,3 provided by
the Act of May 25, 19394 that it shall be lawful for a woman who has been
divorced from the bonds of matrimony to retake her maiden name. She must
file written notice of such intention with the prothonotary of the court where the
divorce was granted and a certificate copy thereof is competent evidence for all purposes of her right to use such maiden nam'e. It will be noticed that this applies
only to an absolute divorce, for a divorce a mensa, et thoro does not terminate
the marriage, while if a purported marriage is annulled, the woman necessarily
reverts to her former name.
F. E. READER*
4250 Pa. 496, 95 Atd. 527 (1915).
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